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:love, at interplanetary center, rhymes 'yellow' with 'pollen' 
: thorn from greenstem equals what the mind cUmbed 
:blue balances it in boundless pendulum of air 
: inviolate Night its source, course. 
"Now in the play that woman, led before the mystic crib, began to sing in 
her quavering voice, and then the voice changed, changed from the voice 
of a witch to that of an angel, and from an angel's voice to a child's, and 
then the answer came . .." 
"great planes that intermingle" 
*... the absolute north, the absolute south ..." 
(Van Gogh) 
"1 am going to put the black and the white 
in a green park with 
pink paths." 
CRITICISM / CHARLES ALTIERI 
The Poem as Act: A Way to Reconcile 
Presentational and Mimetic Theories 
In pre-Romantic poetry the poet's or speaker's acts of mind serve to supple 
ment the context or the argument; in poetry since Romanticism the act of 
mind tends to become the content of the poem. This oversimplified but use 
ful generaUzation should help us understand why the theory of the poem 
as act of mind strikes us as an important subject and should make clear 
the stakes involved in our attempts to construct a theory that will at once 
suffice for poetry in the Romantic tradition and afford a new perspective 
on more traditional poetry. 
We need terms for discussing the act of mind in poetry in large part be 
cause we have come to trust so litttle in older views which subordinate the 
quaUties exhibited by the mind in action to the genera?zations the mind 
achieves. Since Romanticism, however, our poets have come to share, even 
to precipitate, our culture's increasing scepticism with respect to abstract 
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rational structures, moral universals, and symboUc and mythic systems for 
defining the value of particular actions. As Pound put it, we have become 
less interested in the universal truth of ideas than in the quaUties of mind ex 
hibited by a person as he entertains these ideas. We distrust generaUzations 
about experience and judge actions primarily in terms of the quaUties 
they present or the results they produce. 
Romantic poetry dramatizes these general social tendencies by shifting its 
attention away from offering arguments interpreting experience in favor of 
presenting scenes which exhibit the mind in the process of seeking an ade 
quate stance by which to foreground the very process of interpreting the 
particular experience the mind is engaged in. The aim then is not to offer 
conclusions about experience but to present as a performance the kinds of 
mental activity which might most fully disclose how the mind can register 
and respond to the complex dimensions of the scene confronting and engag 
ing it. Poetic thinking becomes largely a matter of what Keats called "sta 
tioning," of demonstrating modes and movements of mental Ufe which in 
tensify our awareness of the mind's powers and of the quickened sense of 
life these powers can provide. Keats' direct heir is, of course, WaUace Ste 
vens with his view of poetry as depicting the mind's strategies to find what 
will suffice and his sense that the measure of significant poetry is not its 
general truth but its flexibility in presenting the various facets and quali 
ties of the Ufe of imagination amidst natural flux. But Stevens only reflects 
on what other modern poets are reflections of: Yeats, EUot, and Auden, for 
example, were concerned less with abstract truths than with exploring 
stances towards experience which might provide authority for their poetic 
meditations and give them access to the needs and powers of their imagina 
tions. 
The critical quest for a theory of poetry as action, then, can be seen 
primarily as another step in the endless process of critics' seeking a lan 
guage that will suffice to describe the poetry that justifies their existence. 
But this quest also has important cultural values in itself?both for practical 
criticism and for the more general (and lamentable) post-Romantic critical 
task of justifying the humane value of poetry. Geoffrey Hartman nicely ex 
presses the implications of this kind of theory for practical criticism. "If 
books are not prophetic, if they do not reveal the 'voice of the shuttle' as 
well as 'the figure in the carpet,' they are expendable."1 Hartman suggests 
here two ways in which the theory of the poem as the activity of the voice 
in the shuttle enables us to transcend the limits of formalist and contextual 
ist criticism. First of all, the voice is a mediator between the realm of praxis 
and that of "the figure in the carpet." By attending to it, the critic gains 
access to the social, psychological, and ontological needs and contradictions 
informing the text's rhetorical structure. And the form itself becomes less an 
104 
object than a process, Uke that Kenneth Burke defined as "symbolic action," 
for deaUng with the larger concerns. 
Second, attention to this voice allows the critic also to move more freely 
in the opposite direction, to treat the poem less as a formal statement than 
as an intense human experience. The critic can, with Thomas Whitaker, see 
the poem as a dramatized act of human speech in which "reaUty becomes 
actual" through the temporal movement of the speaking voice as it pre 
sents its direct emotional and intellectual engagement in a situation.2 More 
over the theory of the poem as act can provide critical terms for judging 
the quaUty of this experience without referring to universal truths or sym 
bolic levels of significance. We can evaluate the quality of the poem as act 
by examining how alive it is to the complexity of the situation it presents. 
And we can speak of its depth in less thematic and abstract terms: depth 
is created by awareness of complexity and by the poet's abiUty to involve us 
in characteristic human concerns and problems. Depth becomes a function 
of dramatic situations, not of explanations thematically proposed as inter 
pretations of the "meaning" of those situations. 
Finally this emphasis on depth as a dimension of situations and of the 
reader's response to the situation enables the theoretical critic to pursue a 
cultural role bequeathed by the New Criticism. Even though most of us re 
ject the practical claims of the New Critics, we find ourselves unable to es 
cape the need they felt to give a justification for poetry that might, by de 
fining the quaUties of literary experience, serve at least to mol?fy the in 
creasing positivism of modern culture. Wallace Stevens claimed that the 
imagination resists "the pressure of reaUty," and he thus defined the cen 
tral intellectual role in our culture for Uterary critics. They must make clear 
how certain forms of cognition disclose quaUties which are not adequately 
explained by scientific models of human experience. The main threat to 
Stevens and the New Critics was behaviorism, and as the reception of 
Skinner's recent work indicates, the threat has not subsided. But contempo 
rary criticism faces in structuralism a more powerful threat, because its lin 
guistic scientific model claims to explain the very quaUties of literary dis 
course on which the old arguments rest, in terms that deny human pur 
posiveness and all dimensions of depth in experience. 
Michel Foucault, for example, has claimed, with an all too human rhetor 
ical flamboyance in his deconstructions, that our age is witnessing "the 
death of man" as a purposive, self-reflexive being. Human activities, he 
feels, can be subsumed into the operations of linguistic structures, and Ro 
land Barthes has proposed a model of Uterary analysis he feels is capable 
of supporting such claims: 
If up until now we have looked at the text as a species of fruit with a 
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kernel (an apricot, for example), the flesh being the form and the pit 
being the content, it would be better to see it as an onion, a construc 
tion of layers (or levels, or systems) whose body contains, finally, no 
heart, no kernel, no secret, no irreducible principle; nothing except the 
infinity of its own envelopes?which envelop nothing other than the 
unity of its own surfaces.3 
Barthes, in effect, denies that literary texts represent any action at all ex 
cept the play of language, and he rejects the basic Romantic claim that the 
act constituting a poetic text is a synthetic one, deepening our awareness of 
the quality of actions by creating complex interrelationships among their 
various aspects. Organic interrelationships show nothing except the capac 
ity of language to operate in several interlocking codes. What Kant had 
proposed as a unique model of the human capacity to order and partici 
pate in complex experience, Barthes disposes. But the theory of the poem 
as act enables us to recover much of the force in Kantian aesthetics. In 
fact it is from Kant, and from less rationaUstic constructions of his theory 
of action by thinkers in the Wittgenstein tradition,4 that we can find the 
terms for restating the challenged assumptions about human values and can 
show how Uterary texts support those assumptions. 
Kant 
argued that no single explanatory scheme will suffice for deaUng 
with human actions. It is crucial to distinguish between the discoveries pos 
sible from a scientific point of view and others provided from a more "intui 
tive" or phenomenological approach. Scientific explanations are limited to 
cause-effect relationships and assume that we must treat actions from a 
third-person perspective as merely events in the physical world. But areas of 
discourse like ethics are meaningless in these terms; only by approaching 
actions from the first-person perspective of the agent can we make sense of 
terms like intention, purpose, and responsibility. Science often makes the 
mistake of confusing the limits of its methodology with the Umits of reality. 
The theorist of the poem as act takes a similar perspective, even when he 
is not clear about his philosophical assumptions. Thus he can argue that it 
is certainly possible to deal with texts from a linguistic perspective and to 
see them as essentially abstract systems of linguistic codes. But structural 
ists are often guilty of introducing their analyses by claiming that their lin 
guistic approach leaves no room for subjectivity and then concluding with 
ontological claims that there is no such thing as subjectivity. The theorist of 
the poem as act can counter, here, that it is also important to see the text 
in terms of first-person activity?both by attending to the activity of the 
reader and by empathizing with the point of view of the speakers and 
actors in the text. Two ways of recovering the text as something more than 
a play of surfaces then emerge, because we can view the text as a temporal 
structure as well as a spatial one. The reader does not merely observe for 
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mal patterns; he gradually integrates them into synthetic wholes that are 
more than the sum of their parts. By attending to the way various strands 
of the text come together to give special weight to certain nodal move 
ments, the reader constructs the work as an embodied act of mind. He re 
covers a process of gradually reflecting on earlier reflections and details 
and of gathering them into complex and highly charged images and sym 
bols.5 Second, the reader does not take the text as an end in itseU, but as the 
means by which he is led to reconstruct the imaginary world of the actions 
represented. He is only a decoder in the sense that he transforms the textual 
signs by calUng upon his full capacities for sympathizing with and under 
standing human actions. I will give an example of both these procedures 
in the final section of my paper. For now it should suffice to point out that, 
despite its excesses, the dream of the organically unified text serves im 
portant ontological and epistemological functions. The organic text does not 
transcend ordinary reality, but it does provide a way of engaging in human 
actions that transcends the conditions of scientific analysis. 
11 
Our very needs for a theory of poetry that corresponds to our cultural situa 
tion make it extremely important that we be careful in posing and scrutin 
izing formulations of the poem as act. The more we need abstract justifi 
cations for a procedure, the more we are apt to accept any theory that 
seems to get the job done. In literary matters, where theory is only justified 
by practice, we have perhaps only our self-respect to lose from inadequate 
theorizing. Nonetheless a coherent theory may serve to concentrate critics' 
attention on one set of questions rather than others, may allow us to con 
tinue to defend the humane impUeations of our discipUne, and, at the very 
least, should make us sufficiently self-conscious to prevent our being naively 
conventional or naively avant-garde. 
We must first of all recognize that there are several valid ways to speak 
about the poem as act. A poem requires various actions of its reader: speak 
ing a poem involves his complex muscular activity; reading it demands his 
actively responding to sensuous qualities of sound and imagistic structure; 
and construing it involves his responding to the poet's human speech and 
sympathizing with the imaginary situation he creates. Moreover the poem 
may be considered the act of an author in several ways?as an act of speech 
and as a performance calling our attention to his verbal, structural, and 
rhythmic skills. Yet these aspects of poetry will not carry the burden of 
values theorists wish to assert in claiming that the poem is an act. For that 
we need to explain how the poem as act can be a unique kind of cognitive 
experience capable of deepening our sense of what is involved in human 
actions. 
I would define poetic action on this cognitive level broadly as the presen 
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tation of human processes which involve reflective consciousness and 
which suggest for a reader the possible values or impUeations in these 
processes. We need then to make two basic sets of distinctions if we are to 
avoid the theoretical tendency to limit the kinds of actions which a poem 
presents. We must first of all recognize that a poem can call attention to 
at least three different forms of conscious action, often in complex combi 
nations: it can present forms of dramatic narrative where the audience is 
asked to sympathize with the character and to construct the moral and 
psychological impUeations of the total action; it can foreground the pro 
cesses of reflection in a dramatized lyric persona expressing immediate 
feeUngs, trying out rhetorical roles, or meditating on a scene, event, or 
idea; and it can foreground the activity of an impUcit author who shows 
signs of his artistic effort to give form to the flux of experience or tries by 
manipulating language and structure to incorporate the perspective of his 
dramatized speaker in a larger, more complex vision. The ballad, the poetry 
of Keats, and that of Yeats might be taken as exemplary of these three 
strategies. 
The second set of distinctions is far more complex and more challenging 
to any single poetic theory. There are among theorists two basic approaches 
to the overall cognitive shape of a poetic action which must be recon 
ciled. I refer to expressive or presentational theories of poetry and to the 
mimetic theories they sought to replace. I shall try to Ust briefly the basic 
claims of both theories and to suggest why neither is adequate in itself. In 
the process I shall treat these claims only as they affect the way practical 
critics treat the action of a poem and I shaU ignore important differences 
between pure presentational theories, which tend to be objectivist Uke 
those of WilUams and Olson, and pure expressionist theories, which tend 
to concentrate on the impUcit activity of the author in the poem. 
The central difference between presentational and mimetic theories is the 
way they consider the poem as action. Presentational theories see the poem 
as an immediate process or activity dramatizing the movement of a mind as 
it tries to estab?sh a meditative equilibrium with an external scene. Ex 
pressionist versions of the theory treat that immediate process as the poet's 
attempt to express and order his feeUngs in poetic form. Mimetic theories, 
on the other hand, are concerned more with the poem as a completed ac 
tion than as an activity: they treat the poem as product rather than process, 
and they stress the rhetorical structure as the primary context for interpret 
ing the dramatic experience as a typical embodiment of characteristic or 
universal human problems. 
Typical presentational and expressionist theories make five basic claims.6 
( 1 ) The poem does not imitate or copy an event outside the poem to which 
it must be faithful. As Joyce and WilUams put it, Uterature imitates nature 
only in the sense that, Uke nature, it is the presentation of continuous crea 
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ti ve activity. (2) Instead of imitating experiences, the poem brings experi 
ence into being by naming or articulating what had been merely vague or 
diffuse impressions. Thus the poem presents what is in effect a new way of 
experiencing the world. (3) Because the poem is a new experience, the 
presentational theorist stresses its immediacy. The poem Uterally places the 
reader in direct contact with an act of mind by virtue of his sharing the 
poet's speech, by his recreating the embodied author's struggles to give 
form to feeUngs, or by his imaginative involvement in the poet's attempt to 
achieve a stance in which his mind can compose a scene and recognize the 
values and numinous forces latent in it. (4) The stress on immediate ex 
perience leads the critic to reject spatial and formal models of literary 
meaning and to insist on one's treating the poem as a temporal construct 
whose meaning unfolds and deepens as he follows the movements of mind. 
(5) Given the emphases on immediacy and temporaUty, the meaning of 
the poem is not considered to reside in any conceptual interpretation of the 
poem but rather to be inherent in the disposition or act of mind the reader 
experiences in reading the poem. Meaning resides in the quaUty of the ex 
perience and cannot be reduced to discursive statements: in Fenollosa's 
terms, what a poem means is what it does. 
Mimetic theory is more difficult to summarize because it has many shades 
and variations. The basic elements, nonetheless, can be recognized if we 
distinguish three basic projects in Aristotle's original formulation of the 
theory. The concept of mimesis is necessary first of all not simply to assert 
that uterary works are copies of real experience, but to define just what 
kind of copies they are. Only in this way could Aristotle respond to Plato's 
attack on literature as merely the copy of a copy. Thus Aristotle insists that 
to clarify how Uterature imitates experience we must grasp the purpose ( or 
in Kant's more sophisticated system "purposiveness") of representation. Far 
from 
merely copying facts, the literary work seeks to create a formal image 
of a course of action which can provide a reflective model of the ways men 
act and can illustrate the meaning and implications of the different ways 
men order the world of facts. In Aristotle's response to Plato, then, there 
are two basic and important critical claims: (1) that the literary text is 
neither merely a copy nor a direct experience of reaUty, but the product of 
a purposive structuring of experience intended to make us sympathize with 
a dramatic situation while also controlling the way we reflect upon it; and 
(2) that literature is a mediated form of expression which can only be re 
lated properly to experience when we attend to the formal means the writer 
has at his disposal to structure the reader's processes of reflection. These 
two principles aUow Aristotle to claim both that Uterature does refer to 
real experiences and that it arranges experience in such a way that it serves 
cognitive purposes. He gets into trouble, however, when he goes on to ex 
plain what those cognitive purposes are. For then he turns away from de 
109 
scription to his own general philosophical definition of meaning as theoria, 
as the way one comprehends the relationship of particulars to universal 
principles.7 He therefore defines the purpose of Uterary imitation as the 
production of catharsis: Uterature imitates actions in order to purify our 
understanding of their nature and probable consequences by leading us to 
see a 
single process of action as a coherent structure of causes and prob 
able effects. 
Aristotle is no simplistic rea?st invoking canons of verisimiUtude; Utera 
ture must be true to the logic and psychology of actions and consequences, 
not to the surface phenomena of experience. Nonetheless his epistemologi 
cal interpretation of the purpose of imitation is terribly Umited and has 
rightly been rejected by Romantic theorists. Aristotle's insistence on plot as 
the shaping of a single narrative action and his concern for meaning in 
terms of universals will not suffice for a good deal of Uterature. Many lyric 
poems, for example, simply present processes of expression or meditation 
which aim to intensify our awareness of qualities in particular acts of mind 
and to give us access to particular moods or modes of feeUng. Some de 
gree of universality, or at least of relevance to other Uves, is necessary, but 
that need not depend on plot or concepts or universal principles. The critic 
need simply describe the resonance created by the process of thinking and 
feeling in order to show its quaUties of depth and comprehensiveness. 
Moreover AristoteUan theory tends, Uke New Criticism, to overstress cri 
teria of unity and thus to mistreat certain kinds of Uterary texts whose power 
depends on articulating incompatible movements of mind or even on radi 
cal contradictions between the theme the author tries to assert and the 
thrust of the imaginary world he creates (Paradise Lost, for example). 
Aristotle's concepts of purpose, mediation, and reflective reference, how 
ever, must remain basic to any adequate Uterary theory. They make clear 
that, while we need expressionist and presentational concepts to deal with 
the poetry engendered by the Romantic rejection of mimetic theory, we 
must recognize the limits of these concepts as explanations of Uterary ex 
perience. The primary failing in these Romantic theories is an insistence 
on immediacy that distorts our ordinary sense of aesthetic experience. One 
crucial aspect of aesthetic experience is our emotional participation in the 
literary work as a continuing dramatic event, but the event of reading also 
requires a certain amount of distance. In reading we reflect on experiences 
as well as participate in them. We become involved in a poem by first 
recognizing that a poem suggests a particular purposive act by an author 
and carries out its purposes by employing the formal devices poetry pro 
vides for eUciting and controlling a reflective meditation on the act pre 
sented. The reader seeks not only to share a poet's experience but to under 
stand it, and that understanding depends on his being aware of the system 
of relationships created within the dramatic event by the poet's rhythmic, 
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styUstic, and structural devices. Thus while a Gary Snyder lyric might seem 
to render a direct experience of nature, claims for its directness must ig 
nore the medium and, more important, ignore the way in which the me 
dium guides the peculiar reflective way we participate in the experience. We 
do not simply see a mind in nature; we consider the poem's syntax as a 
sign of the way the mind composes itself in order to have access to what is 
valuable in the scene, and we reflect upon the poem's specific develop 
ment of the action as a way of dramatizing how human desires and natural 
scenes reinforce one another's value.8 
m 
The difficult burden of trying to integrate these theories has been some 
what Ughtened in the past few years by the work of Richard Ohmann. Oh 
mann is in the process of developing a theory of mimesis that avoids the 
limitations of Aristotle's position. He wants to show how the formal ele 
ments of a text serve to control the reader's reflective participation in the 
action imitated and, more important, he wants to redefine the way a Uter 
ary text refers to ordinary experience so that we can speak of the text's 
meaning without assumptions about conceptual universality or unity of ac 
tion. His theory is based on the idea that a Uterary text is an illocutionary 
act without illocutionary consequences. 
The concept of the illocutionary act derives from J. L. Austin's distinc 
tions between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary forces in an 
utterance; the locutionary force of an utterance estabUshes its sense and 
possible reference, the illocutionary force stems from the kind of speech act 
a person performs, and the perlocutionary force is determined by the effect 
of an utterance on its audience. Illocutionary force registers the difference 
in utterances which have the same reference but signify different acts by 
a 
speaker (e.g., "Alas, Mary's divorced" and "Good, Mary's divorced"), 
and it also explains certain acts we perform in language which are measured 
in terms of felicity rather than of truth and falsity. Thus "I take you for my 
wife" is neither true nor false; instead, saying the words accomp?shes a task 
and incurs rights and obligations if the proper conditions of f eUcity are met. 
In the marriage example the criteria for feUcity are whether the man can 
legally marry and whether the prescribed social conditions are satisfied 
(e.g., the minister must have the proper legal authority, etc.). 
Now Ohmann's crucial insight is that a theory of ?locutions aUows one to 
capture the expressive quality so basic to Uterary utterances while finess 
ing the problems of reference created if we take a text as a locution, or of 
psychological reductionism if we take it simply as a perlocution. And he 
further recognizes that because the felicity of illocutionary utterances de 
pends on social conventions, a view of Uterary texts as imitated illocutions 
immediately places or situates the text in a social context. Imitation then 
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serves two functions. It suspends the ordinary force of the illocution so that 
we can reflect on the act's meaning in its context. And it makes the reader 
create an imaginary world in which he can understand the reasons for the 
statement, judge its feUcity, and relate his sense of the texts' action to his 
sense of society?either to judge the kind of society in which the character 
can perform successful actions or to reflect on the social implications in 
dramatized failures of illocutionary acts. Thus in reading Beckett's Watt, 
we first must recreate the world of the novel to understand its disjointed 
discourse, and then we recognize that Beckett's continually thwarting the 
possibility of felicitous illocutions calls into question a complete system of 
social arrangements.9 
We cannot, however, simply adapt Ohmann's work for the theory of the 
poem as act. There are several problems needing to be ironed out which 
stem from Ohmann's ardor for linking Uterary analysis with potential social 
criticism. I shall briefly develop two of the problems which bear on my 
project. While Ohmann's definition of iUocutionary acts is too broad in some 
respects,10 it is too narrow in others to carry the theoretical weight he 
wants it to. Poems, at least, often do not imitate any kind of iUocutionary 
act and do not call attention to social structures invoked by the forms of 
expression. Many poems are monologues in which a speaker tries to under 
stand his emotions or to focus his meditations on a situation so that he can 
recognize the value and significance latent in it. And other poems, Uke 
Ohmann's example of Wordsworth's ImmortaUty Ode (SAS, 249), which 
gain some of their emotional power from conventional contexts elicited by 
what may loosely be called illocutionary acts, nonetheless depend primar 
ily on the specific quaUties the poet caUs up by the activity of mind he 
dramatizes. Our primary questions about the poem are less concerned with 
the felicity of these illocutionary acts than with the specific relationships 
they estabUsh between the mind and nature. The poem does not simply imi 
tate illocutions, it makes the illocutions part of larger processes of mind 
whose particular richness and intensity require phenomenological reflec 
tion. Ohmann's mimetic theory threatens to save the poem from immediacy 
only to lose it in easy generalizations about verisimilitude or in debate 
about the nature of the poem's dependency on social structures. 
My second objection concerns Ohmann's curious insistence that the poem 
imitates illocutionary acts but is not itself an illocutionary act. We have seen 
that many poems do not contain iUocutionary acts, but every poem qua 
poem is a distinctive form of speech act which invokes specific conven 
tions if it is to be properly understood. Austin does not include speaking 
poetically among his categories, but poetry clearly meets his criteria.11 In 
deed only a concept Uke f eUcity can explain why other criteria than those 
of propositional truth and falsity are important in judging and responding 
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to poetry. Moreover while a poetic monologue is not an illocutionary act, 
we take it as mimetic rather than direct speech because it exists within a 
set of illocutionary conventions. We interpret the conditions impUed by the 
act and reflect on its qualities; we do not respond to it as direct discourse. 
Thus literary works are not imitations of illocutions, but imitations because 
they are illocutions.12 
Once we qualify Ohmann's claims and take the poem itself as an illocution 
ary act, we can go a long way towards reconciling expressionist and mimetic 
theories. For on the level of dramatic action, poems present a variety of di 
rect expressions and illocutions, but these are enclosed within a larger set 
of conventions that lead the reader to approach the dramatic action with the 
curious blend of sympathy and reflective distance characteristic of our 
aesthetic attitudes. Thus we can accept Ohmann's valuable description of 
how the process of imitation leads the reader to reconstruct contexts situat 
ing or placing the activity imitated as possible real human experience in 
some 
setting. But because the poem itself and not specific acts within it 
evokes that procedure, we provide those contexts for all the actions in the 
poem, not just for its illocutions. And because there is such a variety of 
contexts needed, we need not limit ourselves to describing social ones; Ut 
erary acts also call up ontological and psychological situations. 
Finally Ohmann's work provides a crucial distinction which allows us to 
finesse the basic source of conflict between expressionist and mimetic the 
ory. Most of these conflicts develop because the act of creating poems takes 
such different forms. Realists insist that poems copy experience, moraUsts 
that they interpret it, and Romantics that they utter the immediate process 
es of mind or (for Wordsworth) of a memory directly rendering its reac 
tions to and involvement in a situation. But Ohmann shifts the emphasis 
from production to consumption. No matter how the poem is created, our 
response to it takes the form of reflecting upon its dramatized action and 
upon the relationships which formal properties create among the elements 
in the action. Mimesis then can, and perhaps must, be taken primarily as a 
term describing the way in which we relate poetic experiences to existential 
ones. Thus the poem by Wallace Stevens which I shall explicate in my last 
section can be recognized as a pure example of expressionist poetics. It pre 
sents a poet offering a direct temporal meditation on experience with the 
purpose of articulating or naming a set of feelings, and even a unique state 
of mind. We cannot say that it copies an experience we can recognize in 
dependently of the experience of the poem. Yet when we read the poem, 
we do not merely plunge ourselves into it or recreate the expressive act of 
the poet. We try to understand its temporal movement by attending to the 
way the formal elements create internal relationships, and we reflect on 
the poem by trying to comprehend it imaginatively as a possible act in the 
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realm of experience. We ask ourselves what it would be Uke to approach 
experience in the terms Stevens provides, and then we bring that question 
back to supplement our direct experience of the poem. 
I suspect that Ohmann might object to the casual way I adapt a theory 
based on the specific conditions of understanding speech acts to the more 
general consideration of other actions imitated by uterary texts. But this 
adaptation is possible because the concept of illocutionary acts can be sub 
sumed as a subcategory of the larger framework for describing human ac 
tions presented by Erving Goffman as the process of "keying."13 Keying, 
Goffman explains, is a recurrent phenomenon on all levels of animal life. 
Keying is a procedure by which a being takes a new perspective and per 
forms a different set of actions with respect to what might be caUed his 
primary frames for organizing experience. When animals bite one another, 
the primary frame would call for a violent response. But signs can be given 
which key the biting as play, and these signs produce another conventional 
form of proceeding. In a similar way, stage setting signifies that the 
audience is to 
respond to violent actions with different conventional pro 
cedures than those they would adopt if only their primary frameworks were 
invoked. 
As the dramatic metaphors so basic to discussing keying might indicate, 
the concept is a crucial one for discussing Uterary actions. The idea of key 
ing requires two elements?a concrete and specific sensual experience taking 
place, and a definite, often conventional, procedure determining how we 
respond to that experience in ways different from what our behavior would 
be if the signs or keys were not recognized. Thus a philosophical interpre 
tation of an event, unUke a dramatic representation of it, would not be an 
instance of keying because the system of philosophical explanation dis 
places the original concrete content and does not merely change our way 
of relating to it. Literature differs from philosophy precisely in its efforts to 
make us reflect on the significance of concrete experience without displac 
ing that concreteness to the status of mere example. The illocutionary act of 
offering an experience as a Uterary text, then, provides a means of keying an 
experience so that it at once retains its immediacy and is regarded with 
reflective distance. The poem both expresses an experience and, for the 
audience, imitates it. The clearest instances of uterary experience as at once 
direct and keyed are those that best fit Ohmann's theory of imitated illocu 
tions?lyrics and narratives which foreground the expressive activity of a 
dramatic authorial voice. Other modes, Uke meditation, objective novels, or 
dramas, are more difficult to fit because what is hterally presented are de 
scriptions of actions or scripts, not actions themselves. But in so much as 
language can be seen as directly leading us to imagine situations?that is, 
as a clear rather than an opaque, self-referential medium?the same condi 
tions hold. 
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Goffman's model, then, allows me to summarize briefly the values in 
conceiving the poem as act along the Unes I have suggested. We have al 
ready seen that by reconciling expressionist and mimetic theories it ac 
counts to some extent for the curious blend of sympathy and reflective dis 
tance that constitutes our aesthetic response to literature. On the simplest 
level it shows how literary experiences maintain the texture of real events 
while calUng for different kinds of response than those employed when 
there are no keys to alter the primary framework of procedures and expec 
tations. On a more complex level, the keying model illustrates why litera 
ture so 
easily becomes self-referential?for both author and reader. There 
are 
already two levels of experience operating, and it becomes very easy to 
shift keys, to move from presenting experience in a particular key to re 
flecting on the procedures involved in the very act of keying. Thus a text 
can key its own keying, but it usually does so on a level where the audience 
is asked to see that second keying as also the expression of a way of acting 
and assuming stances toward experience. 
This flexibiUty among levels of keying also provides some theoretical 
foundation for a procedure becoming more popular in recent criticism, a 
procedure for conceiving texts dialectically as the articulation of tensions 
between the complex events depicted and the formal structure which seeks 
to interpret the events. As Ohmann has suggested, the primary existential 
level of a text is constituted by fully creating imaginative contexts for the 
actions presented. Now the keying model allows us to grant the full com 
plexity of the event and to see at times that the formal interpretive struc 
ture is not 
adequate to it. The more fully the event itself is recreated, the 
more 
clearly we can judge both the adequacy of the interpretation suggested 
and the possible sources of the inadequacy. Paradise Lost, for example, 
creates a world of which we can say that the more fully we imagine it, the 
more Umited it renders the interpretative keys Milton tries to impose upon 
it. The rhetoric may, as C. S. Lewis shows, claim an increasing loss of dig 
nity for Satan, but the figure Milton calls us to imagine simply acts in ways 
not reducible to that structure. Indeed, if we key on the keying, Milton's 
authorial voice has as much in common with Satan as it does with the 
Christian humanist judging Satan. These tensions, let me add, can be seen 
as 
objectively within the text and not mere ideological interpretations, if 
we have an adequate model for the way poems present human actions. 
Finally the model of keying allows us to explain how the formal elements 
of a text operate. First it suggests that rhythm, structure, and patterns of 
diction, image, and symbol serve to key the work as a Uterary text, and 
in so doing they call attention to themselves as the very means which 
control the reflective procedures they initiate. Second the keying model 
allows us to admit that while the Uterary object is a formal and mediated 
mode of expression, the presence of form does not deny its powers to sig 
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nify or refer to real experience. And it denies claims that formally com 
posed literary objects are thereby transformed into another ontological 
realm, be it the transcendental one claimed by symbolist aesthetics or the 
more demonic imaginary realm proposed in various ways by psychoana 
lysts, Sartrean phenomenologists, and structuralists. Form does not change 
the primary materials but provides a focus for reflecting on them. Form is 
not primarily spatial patterning which creates self-referential objects some 
how divorced from ordinary experience. Formal patterns serve instead to 
compose and intensify the reader's temporal involvement in the experience 
by gradually deepening his awareness of how the various elements in the 
experience are related to one another. Form is a means for viewing actions, 
not for transforming them.14 Thus instead of radically divorcing uterature 
from life, the keying model makes it continuous with any other mode of 
reflecting upon experience. The poem is simply a form developed by so 
ciety to deepen our awareness of what we can be aware of when we act. 
We can be made aware of how consciousness operates in a wide variety of 
contexts, and beyond that, we can recognize that our way of becoming in 
volved in the action serves to satisfy the cultural needs I discussed earUer. 
Poetry itself will not save us, but it may help call attention to dimensions 
of experience which will make us feel we are still worth saving. 
rv 
Poetry will not save us, and theory will not save poetry. Indeed we must 
suspect any theory which claims to present radically new ways of deaUng 
with materials that in large part depend on conventional, if not expUcit, 
contracts between author and audience. All the theorist can do is make ex 
pUcit that contract, suggest its epistemological and behavioral foundation, 
correct limited views of the full experience a poem provides, and offer 
guidelines by which readers can attend to the ways those experiences un 
fold. I would Uke, then, to demonstrate how my theory helps recover the 
full dimension of a late lyric by Wallace Stevens, a poem which is the fruit 
of a lifetime's meditation on poems as acts of mind. I have chosen "Final 
Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour" because it is clearly an expressionist 
poem requiring our attention to the temporal movement of a mind at once 
presenting a new experience and reflecting on the experience as it is articu 
lated. Yet despite the overt expressionist mode, Ohmann's strategies for situ 
ating the poem in a mimetic context, albeit a more ontological Heideggerean 
one than he would grant as relevant, are necessary if we are to disclose the 
poem's full depth. Finally I have chosen the poem because Merle Brown, 
normally a sensitive practical critic, fails in discussing it for reasons that 
stem directly from his inadequate expressionist theory. The more I can 
demonstrate how awareness of formal controls and mimetic contexts deep 
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ens our 
experience of the poem, the more I can justify my claims that ex 
pressionist and mimetic theories must be reconciled. 
I will first quote the poem and then Brown's basic comment on it: 
Light the first light of evening, as in a room 
In which we rest and, for small reason, think 
The world imagined is the ultimate good. 
This is, therefore, the intensest rendezvous. 
It is in that thought that we collect ourselves, 
Out of all the indifferences, into one thing: 
Within a single thing, a single shawl 
Wrapped tightly round us, since we are poor, a warmth, 
A light, a power, the miraculous influence. 
Here, now, we forget each other and ourselves. 
We feel the obscurity of an order, a whole, 
A knowledge, that which arranged the rendezvous. 
Within its vital boundary, in the mind. 
We say God and the imagination are one ... 
How high that highest candle lights the dark. 
Out of this same light, out of the central mind, 
We make a dwelUng in the evening air, 
In which being there together is enough. 
The sense of the fancifulness, of the unreality, of the oneness of the 
experience keeps the poem from being fanciful and unreal. Even so, the 
excluded things are not felt as an ominous threat; the poem is domi 
nated by the dreamy pleasure of neglecting the othernesses of the world 
and of one's body. The poem must seem silly unless it is taken as a 
delicate articulation of the comfort experienced by an old man whose 
imagination has escaped from the tentacles of his body and flowed 
into a oneness with what he feels to be the governing force of his 
world.15 
The irony here is that Brown's concern for the author's expressive act and 
his desire to locate the original savage feeUng being given form lead him to 
a bad version of imitation theory. For the critical question his analysis 
raises is the problem of determining from the poem what existential context 
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best gives significance to the mental processes enacted. Brown is correct to 
see that the dominant affective quaUty of the poem is "an ease of mind." 
However because his theory does not grant the formal quaUties of the poem 
enough power to control our reflections, he immediately posits a rather siUy 
existential model for the feeling. The import of the poem resides instead 
in the process of thinking it dramatizes and in the imaginative act it re 
quires of the reader if he is to interpret the relationship the mind has here 
to its own reflections. The crucial question here is not who is the speaker 
but where is he, what space of the mind is he inhabiting. 
The opening Une signifies that we are not deaUng with a simple dramatic 
situation, but rather with an act of reflection that presents a unique kind of 
mental existence. 
"Light the first Ught of evening" seems to have a clear 
illocutionary force which places the speaker in a typical domestic setting. 
But the following simile "as in a room . . ." demands a radical change in 
focus. The initial domestic setting is now as metaphoric as it is real, and 
when the poem goes on to treat the room in both physical terms ("rest") 
and terms defining the Ught and the room as possible mental entities, the 
reader must search for a way to situate the illocution. The two abstract 
structural patterns of the poem are our major clue to determining the imag 
inary site and to defining the interior paramour: one pattern gradually 
spirituaUzes the possible meanings and analogues of the initial "Ught the 
first light," while the second pulls against that symbolic thrust with con 
tinual reminders of man's poverty, like "for small reason," which insist 
that whatever values the imagination discovers must reside in something 
Uke a domestic situation. (Even Wordsworth's conjugal pair, the mind and 
nature, must eventually take up a dwelling in the narrow confines of a 
civilized order.) This spatial pattern, however, is not the meaning of the 
poem but the structure of the terms it seeks to resolve in a temporal process 
that unfolds through a variety of mental acts. 
The first stanza develops the vacillating mental process by breaking the 
opening statement into two major verbs in the relative clause, "rest" and 
"think." The first verb picks up the domestic context of the illocution and 
the room metaphor, and it is echoed in the wry "for small reason," while 
the second verb picks up the fact of the opening metaphoric transformation 
and begins to relate "lighting" to a realm of abstract imaginative activity 
and a vocabulary of ultimate value terms. The second stanza then reenacts 
a process of thinking set in motion by the initial abstractions. "Therefore" in 
dicates that the mind is already trying to reflect upon its own reflections, 
but the process is a difficult one. The first act in the stanza returns to the 
local setting, the "this," only in abstract terms. And we are then immediately 
moved back into the mind's motions as it tries to give resonance to its own 
summary metaphor of the rendezvous. The mind seeks to collect itself, but 
the vagueness of "one thing" and the ambiguity of "that thought," which 
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can refer either to the first stanza or the opening of the second, indicate 
the danger in this self-reflection. 
The third stanza changes the direction of thought to concrete meta 
phorical expressions of affective feeling and concludes the first half of the 
poem with a synthesis of the two realms. Thought in the second stanza had 
produced an abstract and unspecified idea of unity; now the space opened 
by that thought (as the repetition suggests) allows metaphoric thinking 
and breeds a series of appositions which, by their lack of causal or hier 
archial connectives, produce a rich sense of the coexistence of concrete and 
abstract elements. The mind is enclosed in a physical space and bodily af 
fections, yet the physical space seems to become at the same time enclosed 
in an act of mind. The central function of the series of appositions is to re 
gather the physical qualities of light while extending the idea of lighting a 
light into a realm of metaphor where it will ultimately by paralleled to 
God's creative "Fiat lux." The appositions progress from "warmth," a physi 
cal quaUty of Ught which nonetheless only comes to consciousness through 
the "shawl" metaphor, to "power," a term with both physical and spiritual 
qualities, to the spiritual realm where one acclaims "a miraculous influ 
ence." (Notice also that the series moves from bare nouns to one modified 
by an adjective as the spiritual expansion involves the emotions, and that 
indefinite articles give way to a definite one, suggesting how on the level 
of imagination various specifics share the determining influence. ) 
The fourth stanza introduces the second half of the poem by placing the 
miraculous influence back into the immediate scene. "Here, now" echoes 
EUot's phrase for the sexual incarnational presence of the word. Indeed this 
full acceptance and celebration of the immediate present is probably the 
single most important triumphant theme in modern poetry. And Stevens 
follows the exclamation with an exphcit reference to feeling in order to 
express the effect of the abstractions on the speaker's concrete self. But the 
celebration also moves in another direction. As Hegel tells us, the expres 
sions "here" and "now," so dear to empirical philosophy, are really quite 
abstract terms; they simply express a mental state unless defined by 
physical coordinates. And this is precisely Stevens' point: "here, now" re 
fers to a sense of presence, but one which is located at once in a possible 
concrete room and in the act of forgetting empirical reaUties as one is car 
ried into an awareness that a transcendent order is also present. Stevens is 
playing here with the metaphor of incarnation?an initial sense of sexual 
presence becomes also a secular awareness that a transcendent order enters 
the flesh and transforms it. 
The fifth stanza makes explicit the synthesis which the poem has been 
preparing and, through the ellipses, dramatizes the changes in mental ac 
tivity as the mind comes to recognize where it stands. The first two lines 
present the mind returning in a casual way to the limits of abstraction ("we 
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say") in order to define what has happened. "We say God and the imag 
ination are one" because the speaker ( drawn into an identity with his para 
mour) reaUzes that the simple human creative act of Ughting the Ught and 
the effects of that act on his imaginative sense of his condition parallel 
God's creation of a world so that he can look back, say it is good, and 
rest.16 The ellipses then suggest that the mind has reached the limits of 
abstraction, but these Umits are not felt as a negation. Instead they produce 
a transformation as thought gives way to exclamation. The exclamation is a 
simple illocution, but it is only by reflecting on what justifies this illocu 
tion that we come to recognize how appropriate the candle metaphor is 
here. The candle metaphor synthesizes the original Ughting, God's "Fiat 
lux," and the subsequent imaginative awareness of what the metaphoric 
?parallel means for man's limited condition. It is precisely the presence of 
darkness, both literally and figuratively, which demands creation of the 
Ught. The implication here is that precisely because of man's perennial pov 
erty he can continually appropriate for himself powers that God only used 
once. Moreover it is the exclamation itself which dramatizes what it means 
to 
recognize the parallel between man and God. The exclamation registers 
the sense of wonder that derives from man's meditating on his own powers 
even when confined to the narrow room of his poverty. And it is only within 
the exclamation, within the speaker's emotional response to his own crea 
tivity, that abstraction and concreteness are thoroughly unified through the 
synthesis of the candle metaphor. That metaphor is obviously important 
semantically, but its full meaning emerges only when we ask what is in 
volved in the act of the speaker who utters it at this particular point in the 
poem's temporal unfolding. 
The last stanza returns us to quiet reflection, to the "sad, waste time 
stretching before and after," but in Stevens' world the decomposition of 
vision produces acceptance not despair. One reason for the acceptance is 
that even in quiet reflection the imagination and the scene remain inte 
grated and the plain speech of poverty remains charged with resonance. 
The poem's final apposition presents a lovely balance of physical and men 
tal reaUties. The Ught reminds us of the mind's power to enter experience, 
while the parallel reference to the central mind suggests that the mind is as 
concrete as the light. The speaker has learned to inhabit a mental space at 
once 
absolutely concrete and absolutely reflective, just as Santayana in 
another poem learns to dwell in the two homes, the centers of empire and of 
the religious imagination. And again the major verbs are crucial. Through 
out the poem Stevens employs a strategy, picked up by Robert Creeley, of 
using elemental words like "here, now" to carry philosophical weight and to 
embody the theme that our actual candle blazes with artifice. In the final 
stanza the key terms are "make" and "being there." These terms express the 
full range of the poem's desire to integrate imaginative activity with man's 
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primary need to dwell fully in the confines of his domestic situation. What 
these terms rend asunder, "together" integrates in a last triumphant expres 
sion, the more triumphant because the term is so casual. Yet on the syn 
tactic and phonological levels of the poem's activity the term is not casual at 
all. 
"Together" breaks the flow of the last line, but only to reinforce what 
it means actively to be there and to express a quiet awareness of the many 
syntheses the poem has achieved. Moreover as "together" calls attention to 
itseU by breaking the syntax, it also calls attention to the fact that even 
phonologically this word gathers most of the dominant sounds in the line 
into a linguistic, non-symbolic togetherness. 
To appreciate fully the poem's last word, "enough," we must generalize 
about the kind of meditative space Stevens has created. The word brings 
the pattern of poverty terms to a climax and expresses the central idea of 
heroism in Stevens' work. For Stevens the central heroic act is the achieve 
ment of sufficiency, of a state of awareness which recognizes the power of 
imagination to act in the world without allowing imagination to transform 
the world and to provide only the consolations of mythology. The aim is to 
concentrate on the acts of imagination without pursuing the inherent con 
tents of the imagination (as Blake does), which resist the pressures of reality 
only by leading the mind to live in unrealities soon to mock men with their 
insubstantia?ty. Thus in "Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour," the 
metaphorical analogies of the light eventually negate any transcendent 
source of creation, and, like the Ught itself, remain only as properties illum 
inating man's physical world and metaphysical poverty. 
If we are to remain in the concrete world and still participate fully in 
the creative life of the imagination, a poetry imitating moments of numi 
nous perception Uke those so common in imagism and in contemporary 
poetry will not suffice. It ignores the mind's capacity to recapture its powers 
to create 
myths in an empirical framework. Stevens' task is to make us learn 
to inhabit a kind of reflective space which blurs the boundaries between 
container and contained and presents mind and world as Uterally one. It is 
just the act of a mind in this reflective space which Stevens imitates in the 
poem we have been considering, and the formal structure of his imitation 
leads the reader to recreate this space in his own reflective activity. The 
poem asks us to participate in it by reconstituting the unique mode of being 
in which its illocutions, appositions, and metaphoric transfers seem really 
possible. The reader is asked to create a "dwelUng" which carves out a 
unique space for the mind to occupy. The blueprint for that dwelling is 
the poem, especially its last apposition where the physical light, its meta 
phorical analogues, and the central mind evoked by those analogues, all 
exist on a single plane of being. In his earlier poetry Stevens had vacillated 
between a faith in the vitality of a concrete scene energized by imagination 
and a sense that what would suffice would only emerge if the mind learned 
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to abstract itseU from the scene and reflect on the source of imaginative 
activity in the figure of Major Man. In "Final SoUloquy," as in so many of 
his last poems, the act of the poem creates a space in which both forces 
come together and require one another without tension.17 The world exists 
neither for meditation nor in meditation but as meditation?and Stevens 
has taught us to recognize the fuU temporal and hypothetical dimensions of 
that lovely connective which perhaps defines the ontological status of aU 
poetry. 
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poem becomes less a way of viewing experience than a unique object somehow either 
free of the contradictions of 
ordinary experience or more complex and unified than any 
ordinary experience. The question, I suppose, is whether the qualities of action which 
a poem makes us aware of are latent in experience or only available within the com 
plex structures of literary discourse. 
15 The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1964), p. 524, 
and Brown, pp. 180-81. In aU fairness I should point out that Brown does not pretend to 
offer a fuU 
analysis of the poem. 
16 Brown, pp. 179-80, claims that this stanza is not earned: it comes too easily unless 
we imagine an old man's state of mind. We see here quite clearly how his need for 
original feeUngs to be transformed, feelings he can only find with difficulty in order to 
justify this line, leads him to a problematic model of verisimilitude, and more important 
it denies the contextual power of the poem to define the role of such lines as elements 
in a process of developing mental activity. The stanza is less a claim about reaUty than 
a prospect on reaUty, justified by a particular train of thought in a particular imaginative 
site or situation. The status of the speaker is not foregrounded in this poem, so it is not 
his quaUties but the quaUties of reflection which justify an utterance. In a poem like 
"Prufrock" the situation is quite different: there the site of the poem is within the head 
of a particular character, and we must project the psychological conditions informing 
his speech acts in order to appreciate the poem. 
17 The best critical locus for explaining this space of mind is Northrop Frye's discus 
sion of anagogy in Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957), pp. 
115-130. Stevens, however, gives anagogy a secular twist: as nature becomes contained 
in mind, the mind takes on a kind of physical existence. 
124 
